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Abstract
This article is a transcription of an electronic symposium in which
some active researchers were invited by the Brazilian Society for
Neuroscience and Behavior (SBNeC) to discuss the last decade’s
advances in neurobiology of learning and memory. The way different
parts of the brain are recruited during the storage of different kinds of
memory (e.g., short-term vs long-term memory, declarative vs proce-
dural memory) and even the property of these divisions were dis-
cussed. It was pointed out that the brain does not really store memo-
ries, but stores traces of information that are later used to create
memories, not always expressing a completely veridical picture of the
past experienced reality. To perform this process different parts of the
brain act as important nodes of the neural network that encode, store
and retrieve the information that will be used to create memories.
Some of the brain regions are recognizably active during the activation
of short-term working memory (e.g., prefrontal cortex), or the storage
of information retrieved as long-term explicit memories (e.g., hippo-
campus and related cortical areas) or the modulation of the storage of
memories related to emotional events (e.g., amygdala). This does not
mean that there is a separate neural structure completely supporting
the storage of each kind of memory but means that these memories
critically depend on the functioning of these neural structures. The
current view is that there is no sense in talking about hippocampus-
based or amygdala-based memory since this implies that there is a one-
to-one correspondence. The present question to be solved is how
systems interact in memory. The pertinence of attributing a critical
role to cellular processes like synaptic tagging and protein kinase A
activation to explain the memory storage processes at the cellular level
was also discussed.
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The last decade of this millenium was
considered as “The Brain Decade” because
research in this field increased exponen-
tially. Among the many subjects under study
in neuroscience, the Neurobiology of Learn-
ing and Memory is considered by Steven
Rose as the brain’s Rosetta stone (1). The
Rosetta stone was the key to the decoding of
the Egyptian hieroglyphs, because it con-
tained a text written in this and two other
languages, Demotic Egyptian and Greek. As
the Rosetta stone, the memory code, if it
really exists, will be the key to the decoding
of all brain functions. In order to discuss the
scientific advances achieved by science in
this field, the Brazilian Society of Neurosci-
ence and Behavior (SBNeC) organized a
virtual symposium held on March 10, 2000
in a chat site provided by the Conselho Na-
cional de Desenvolvimento Científico e
Tecnológico (CNPq). The present article was
written based on the transcription of this
symposium.
Gilberto Xavier: At the system level,
how is the information encoded into and
maintained in the different memory systems?
Are there differences in the representation
code for these systems? Are the retrieval
mechanisms different?
Ivan Izquierdo: There are many differ-
ences among memories at the system level.
First, and perhaps foremost, is the difference
between short- and long-term processes,
which are handled by different structures or
the same structures with different timing.
Second, working memory is a separate entity
from all the others. Third, and very impor-
tant, is declarative and procedural memory,
which involves different systems. But I’m
afraid this doesn’t answer your question,
does it?
Aryeh Routtemberg: We were just re-
viewing in class a short paper published in
Nature (2). I think it is intriguing if short-
term and long-term memory are separate and
the latter not dependent on the former. How-
ever, why is the failure of short-term memory
not a retrieval one?
Ivan Izquierdo: Better than that article
is a recent review which came out in Behav-
ioural Brain Research (3) a few months ago.
The evidence that short-term memory fail-
ure is not a retrieval failure is that the re-
trieval of short-term memory is specifically
affected by few treatments given, say, 10
min before the test, whereas the same treat-
ments (protein kinase A (PKA) inhibitors,
PD098058, etc.) given 0, 22 or 45 min before
liquidate short-term memory.
Lynn Nadel: I haven’t read the Nature
paper, but the idea that short-term and long-
term memory might be separate is well es-
tablished. Ivan’s latest comment points out
two ways this could happen. I don’t, how-
ever, find it very useful in the declarative/
procedural distinction, so perhaps someone
could help me see what that adds.
Ivan Izquierdo: Lynn, you may be right.
Bures recently presented a talk at a small
symposium in his country called “How de-
clarative can a rat’s memory be?”, in which
he also argued that it is simply impossible to
measure any memory in rodents or even
bigger animals without measuring proce-
dures.
Lynn Nadel: Ivan - What I think is im-
portant is to find principled ways of distin-
guishing memory systems, ones that go be-
yond the procedures used to measure them. I
prefer to use the terms explicit and implicit
because Schacter and others who coined
them were clear that these were only opera-
tional definitions. It is important to detect
differences such as “flexibility of use” and
the like, in distinguishing memory systems.
Elizabeth Warrington (4) showed about 30
years ago that you could get long-term
memory in the absence of short-term memory,
and that was the basis for her arguments
against Brenda Milner’s (5) consolidation
view of hippocampal function.
Aryeh Routtemberg: Lynn - What I
should have made clear is that short-term
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and long-term memory are independent and
that Ivan showed... and there is not much on
this as yet... that you can observe long-term
memory in the absence of short-term memory.
This is intriguing and gets to the heart of a
new way of looking at multiple memory
systems.
Ok, Lynn and Ivan... assuming that you
have long-term memory in the absence of
short-term memory demonstrated in rats and
humans, what kind of neural/molecular mech-
anism do you envision operating to produce
that consequence? Are there cases in the
‘normal’ individual where this occurs?
James McGaugh: Aryeh - I thought this
was what Warrington and Shallice reported
years ago (4).
Aryeh Routtemberg: Jim and Lynn -
Were these in normal subjects?
James McGaugh: Aryeh - No, in a pa-
tient. Not an often cited paper.
Lynn Nadel: Good question, Aryeh! Jim,
what Warrington and Shallice (4) reported
had to do with conduction aphasics, who
indeed had poor short-term memory and good
long-term memory. But the trick is they were
talking about different “contents” (recall that
their work predated the multiple memory
systems idea).
Ivan Izquierdo: Depressed short-term
memory in the presence of good long-term
memory is characteristic of patients with
delirium, and, to some extent, of depressive
patients.
Lynn Nadel: That is very interesting - I
would appreciate getting citations to those
data later on. How many of you are aware of
the recent report of decreased hippocampal
volumes in chronically depressed people?
Ivan Izquierdo: What I just said is from
psychiatry textbooks. At least that’s where
I’ve seen it mentioned.
Orlando Bueno: I believe that in hu-
mans it is necessary to distinguish between
short-term memory of different contents
(speech, visuo-spatial, as the phonological
and visuo-spatial loops in Baddeley’s mo-
del) and short-term memory for semantically
processed material. Short-term memory for
speech and visuo-spatial material is very
short in duration (seconds) and usually as-
sessed by a span test (digit span, blocks of
Corsi) (5). But I’m not sure about the present
status of short-term memory (or recent
memory, whatever name one gives to it) for
meaningful material in the cognitive psy-
chology literature. Anyway, I feel as a chal-
lenging matter for the next years a closer
integration among cognitive psychology,
neuropsychology and neurobiology of mem-
ory.
Aryeh Routtemberg: Ok, guys, so any
thoughts on how short-term memory is liqui-
dated (Ivan’s term) while long-term memory
remains solvent?
Gilberto Xavier: Aryeh, attention could
be in the control of the process of sending
information either to short-term memory or
long-term memory. This would help to un-
derstand how information gets into implicit
memory systems as well. What do you think?
Lynn Nadel: Aryeh - The problem of
poor short-term memory/good long-term
memory is only a problem if you think (a la
Hebb) that the former is the necessary gate-
way to the latter. If they are handled by
different systems, or even within the same
system but by mechanisms that are not caus-
ally linked, then the result poses no particu-
lar problem.
James McGaugh: Unfortunately, Hebb
was wrong about the causal link between
short-term memory and long-term memory.
Lynn Nadel: Jim - What exactly do you
mean by saying “short-term memory uses
long-term memory”?
James McGaugh: Lynn - It seems obvi-
ous. Short-term memory must be about some-
thing. And it is always about things we al-
ready know about. Try your digit span. Try
reading this. All in short-term memory im-
mediately and all uses well-established long-
term memory.
Gilberto Xavier: If we adopt the con-
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cept of working memory as proposed by
Baddeley, the difficulties to understand the
interaction between short-term and long-term
memory diminish; apparently it becomes an
attentional question, doesn’t it?
Claudio Da Cunha: Ester Palacios, from
Vitoria, Brazil, e-mailed us a message ask-
ing about the participation of the prefrontal
cortex in the working memory processes.
Richard Morris: I’m not an appropriate
person to comment on the role of the pre-
frontal cortex in working memory - maybe
Alan Baddeley can say a word or two. Or
else check out Paulesu’s (6) review articles.
Also Jonides (7).
Larry Cahill: Regarding the e-mailed
question about the prefrontal cortex, I think
the work of Petrides (8) and others has made
it clear that while it is involved in various
“manipulation” aspects of memory, it can-
not be essential for memory per se as lesions
have little or no effect. When a task involves
some sort of manipulation of information,
prefrontal cortex lesion effects seem to fall
out, but not when simple retention of infor-
mation per se is required.
Alan Baddeley (message e-mailed dur-
ing the chat): As a cognitive psychologist I
am pleased with the extent to which our
analysis of human memory into separate but
interrelated systems has proceeded and con-
solidated. There remain many controversies,
but broadly speaking, most people would
accept the usefulness of a distinction be-
tween long-term and working memory, and
within working memory into separable visuo-
spatial, verbal and executive components. In
long-term memory there is now abundant
evidence for separable implicit learning and
memory systems, which differ from episodic
memory and from semantic memory, al-
though the relationship between these last
two remains controversial. In terms of links
with neurobiology, I think the development
of neuroradiological methods has been very
productive - initially much of the work was
concerned with validating the methods and
showing that there are parallels between scan-
ning results and those obtained on the basis
of cognitive studies and lesion approaches.
We are now, I think, in a position to begin
using scanning as a means of answering
carefully targeted questions.
Challenges for the future? One major
challenge is to ensure that we combine good
questions with advancing scanning tech-
niques - there is a temptation often to take a
particular paradigm and simply label it with
the name of some cognitive function. For
example, in my own area, working memory
is often regarded as synonymous with the n-
back task - a useful but complicated para-
digm that is difficult to interpret theoreti-
cally. I think scanning and other electro-
physiological methods offer a very useful
tool for tackling the important but difficult
issues of executive control. In the longer
term, I have high hopes for our improved
capacity to label neurotransmitters. As cog-
nitive psychologists, we will need to be bet-
ter at dealing with situations in which the
modulation of a whole system is changed,
rather than one in which a particular sub-
component is removed, for example by le-
sion. I expect that diseases that reflect defi-
cits of this kind, perhaps schizophrenia and
Alzheimer’s disease for example, will prove
theoretically as well as practically impor-
tant. Finally, I hope that my many colleagues
working on the neurobiological basis of
memory will converge on some more well-
established interpretations that can be
mapped onto what we know of the cognitive
psychology of memory. Sorry I am not able
to take a more active part in what I am sure
will be a lively and stimulating session. Best
wishes, Alan Baddeley.
Joaquin Fuster: Dear Alan, I agree with
you, the identification of different systems
for memory has been an unquestionable ad-
vance. I am afraid, however, that this has led
to misconceptions on the part of many cog-
nitive neuroscientists. There is no greater
problem in this field now than the tendency
997
Braz J Med Biol Res 33(9) 2000
Neurobiology of learning and memory
to allocate separate cognitive functions to
separate neural structures - though each struc-
ture may participate differently and to a dif-
ferent degree in different functions. That
tendency is largely the result of misinterpre-
tations of lesion results and a hypertrophy of
the concept of “module” which originated in
sensory physiology. Both have led us to a
new phrenology more or less legitimized by
the scientific method. It is appropriate to
dissect cognitive functions by experimental
and cognitive psychology, as Aristotle would
have undoubtedly approved. But our suc-
cess in separating cognitive functions or con-
tents (episodic memory, working memory,
the “where”, syntax of language, retrieval...)
does not imply that there is a separate neural
structure for each. We should certainly avoid
the usage of relative differences (in tasks,
areas, functional magnetic neuroimage acti-
vation - i.e., subtractions), as justifications
for the categorical allocation of a particular
cognitive function to a particular piece of
cortex or cluster of cells. I address this com-
ment to you, Alan, fully aware that I am
preaching to the converted, for you have
shown repeatedly serious misgivings about
what I, not very originally, call the new
phrenology. This gives me also the opportu-
nity to share with you, who is the father of
the concept of working memory, something
quite amusing. After discovering “working-
memory cells” in the prefrontal cortex (9), I
feel condemned to spend the rest of my life
convincing people that working memory is
not the only function of the prefrontal cortex
and the prefrontal cortex is not the only
cortex involved in working memory. Funny
world! Cheers, Joaquin.
James McGaugh: Are there some
broader issues to discuss? I think it is now
extremely clear that short-term and long-
term memory are independent processes. So,
what are the implications? We need systems
and mechanisms for both and both must be
able to interact in microseconds. After all,
short-term memory uses long-term memory.
The big problem in memory is not whether
it is short or long (it is both) but how infor-
mation is integrated in such a way that it can
be retrieved and affect flexible performance.
No use to store something if it cannot be
adequately accessed. We have focused on
the storage problem to a large degree be-
cause we have no hypotheses about how
behavioral responses use stored information
in a flexible way. Or does anyone have such
hypotheses?
Lynn Nadel: Richard - Here’s a thought
I’ve had about a possible difference between
frontal and hippocampal contributions to
episodic memory. Imagine for a moment that
the hippocampus rapidly establishes a “tem-
plate” or trace that serves to link together
various neocortical/limbic representations of
all the things that happen in an episode.
What is missing from this “static” ensemble
is information about the sequence in which
these things went together during the epi-
sode. This, I think, is what the frontal contri-
bution could be, and why it seems so crucial
in “working memory”, which is nothing but
a record of the sequence of recently experi-
enced things.
Richard Morris: OK Lynn. But let’s
focus on your ‘rapidly’. I’d like to add ‘auto-
matically’ to that, rather than ‘effortfully’.
That is, the hippocampus is clocking away,
recording events-in-scenes that are attended
to, regardless of where a subject is directing
his efforts with respect to encoding. I’m
attracted to the idea of a distinction between
‘automatic’ components of episodic encod-
ing (hippocampal) and ‘effortful’ compo-
nents (the classical Tulving (10) list learning
experiment).
James McGaugh: Richard and Lynn -
Do we know that the hippocampus proper is
doing specific things in memory? Things,
that is, that are not also done by other brain
regions?
Lynn Nadel: As to some special role for
the hippocampus - the latest data from re-
mote memory studies seem to show that
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there are always subtle differences after hip-
pocampal damage (11-13). There are also
strong data indicating a necessary role for
the hippocampus in some kinds of naviga-
tional situations, but I’m not sure that is a
“memory” function per se.
Richard Morris: Only connect!!! Every-
thing is combinatorial. Soon we will have an
electronic journal called “Associative Mo-
lecular Biology”!!!! Mind you, if it is
“Transgenic Associative Molecular Biology”
maybe Aryeh won’t want to be on the Edito-
rial Board!! Sorry to lower the tone, folks -
back to serious stuff!!
James McGaugh: Richard (and Aryeh) -
Aryeh might want to be Senior Editor of
such a journal. Why not?
Aryeh Routtemberg: Settle down, boys.
Lynn Nadel: Richard - OK. I suppose
one could see the frontal role as relating to
effortful encoding, as distinct from the auto-
matic nature of hippocampal action, but
which part of the system solves the sequence
problem that I raised? This also applies to
retrieval (Jim) - when we retrieve an epi-
sodic memory, how do we get the bits and
pieces in the right temporal order?
Richard Morris: Lynn - sequences are
tough. I’m still not sure how good animals
are at sequences. The latest purely behavior-
al primate data on this question reveal
competences, but not much more than that. It
is an important issue, I concede, but is the
ability to remember things accurately in se-
quence likely to be something for which
there would have been a great deal of selec-
tive pressure in early mammalian evolution
when the hippocampus and prefrontal lobe
came along?
Lynn Nadel: Richard - A good point, but
think about it more implicitly - even lowly
animals need to get sequences right in order
to get causality right - it matters if the condi-
tioned stimulus precedes or follows the un-
conditioned stimulus, and animals are ca-
pable of remembering this sort of thing. I am
particularly intrigued by the connection be-
tween sequences and causal judgments...
Lynn Nadel: This forum gives me a
chance to ask Larry and Jim something -
what are your current views on the impact of
arousal/stress on memory - do you think that
it is always positive, or is it U-shaped, or
does it depend on what kind of memory one
is talking about (e.g., amygdala-based, hip-
pocampal-based, etc.)?
Larry Cahill: Lynn - I see no reason to
think any brain structure or system operates
in a non-inverted U fashion in memory.
Ivan Izquierdo: Maybe it’s late to raise
such a potentially explosive point. But, what
are the grounds to talk about “amygdala-
based” as opposed to “hippocampal-based”
memory? I, for one, don’t see any.
James McGaugh: I agree with Ivan’s
comment.
Ivan Izquierdo: Jim - Thank you. It is a
very basic point.
Lynn Nadel: Ivan - Excellent point - and
we don’t have enough time left to deal with
it. I was hoping to get away with it.
Richard Morris: Amygdala-based mem-
ory. I’m rather disturbed about Larry Squire’s
exclusion of the amygdala-based memory
from the class of representational types of
memory (declarative in his terms) (14). The
exclusion is based on the failure of amygdala
lesions to affect delayed non-matching - but
that is perhaps not the best of rocks on which
to rest any theory just now. Surely we can
‘declare’ our emotional states? What is the
basis for excluding amygdala-dependent
memory from representational memory?
Larry Cahill: Richard - The failure of
amygdala lesions to affect the delayed-non-
matching-to-sample task (a memory task used
mainly for monkeys) fits nicely with the
view that its primary function is to influence
long-term memory consolidation for stress-
hormone releasing events.
James McGaugh: Richard - Amygdala
dependent, in my view, does not mean emo-
tional content (15,16). Amygdala activity
modulates memory of what to do in a water
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maze and where to go. It modifies memory
of the size of a reward, it modifies memory
of a story, etc. etc. I think it is a mistake to
identify the amygdala with emotion. Emo-
tion activates this region but the consequences
need not be and usually are not memories of
emotions.
Orlando Bueno: I think Jim has touched
the point. The important thing is to find out
how the structures and memory systems work
together and so we would find that the amyg-
dala participates in some way in declarative
memory as an enhancer of memory (17,18).
James McGaugh: Lynn - It is time for all
of us to stop talking about “amygdala based”
or “hippocampus based” as that implies that
there is a one-to-one correspondence which,
of course, is nonsense. What we need to
know is how systems interact in memory.
We have shown very clearly that amygdala
activity regulates memory that involves hip-
pocampal activity (i.e., explicit memory).
Thus, the amygdala is very clearly part of the
explicit memory system as are, no doubt,
many other brain systems. There are no “hip-
pocampal memories” and there are no “amyg-
dala memories”. If you think there are, direct
me to the references supporting that view.
Lynn Nadel: Jim - Of course I agree with
you - in fact I think we should dump the
whole term “memory”. What we store is
information, and we later use that to “create”
memories.
Richard Morris: Lynn - exactly! Traces
are stored. Memories are created!
Ivan Izquierdo: Lynn - as to “creating”
memories out of the information we store.
Yes, maybe that is related to Squire’s con-
cept that consolidation takes years (14). I
would, like most, restrict use of the word
consolidation to the 6 h or so period in which
memories are really set down after encoding.
But I, again like most, would agree with Jim
that we do form new memories on top of old
ones, eventually modifying them and mak-
ing up veritable lies. Every time we retrieve
we probe into the complex and draw bits of
one memory or other mixed with bits of
other, usually older memories. The memo-
ries of many old people seem to be built like
old cities (Jerusalem, Rome), tie over tie of
older and older memories; you drill in, take
up some material and the final result is often
false. My mother, who otherwise had a good
memory, confused events of my youth with
those of her brother’s; two persons she liked
and who had a few things in common.
Lynn Nadel: Ivan - I agree that separat-
ing the short-lasting “consolidation” events
from the longer-lasting (many years) things
is crucial. Another topic for the next ses-
sion...
Claudio Da Cunha: I agree with Ivan,
but how are these traces of information
coded? In my opinion, if we compare our
knowledge about the neurobiology of learn-
ing and memory with the knowledge in ge-
netics we are in a pre-double-helix stage: we
cannot decode a brain state as traces of infor-
mation useful to create memories. We can-
not decode the information files! My guess
is that with the refinement of the resolution
of functional neuroimages this will be pos-
sible in the future.
Joaquin Fuster: In answer to Claudio’s
question, I suggest we should, at least in
principle, accept the concept of network rep-
resentation in the cortex and the distributed
nature of all cognitive functions and types of
memory (9), however difficult our experi-
ments may thus become. I can see no better
source of progress now than that position of
principle.
Lynn Nadel: Claudio - I agree with your
assessment of the problem, but not with your
optimism about the resolution coming from
the kind of functional neuroimaging avail-
able now (or in the foreseeable future). I
think Joaquin touched on some of the prob-
lems with this approach.
Claudio Da Cunha: Indeed my opti-
mism that we (or most probably the next
generations) will discover a kind of key for
decoding these traces of information that the
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brain uses to compose trace memories is not
based only on functional neuroimages. Now,
as Dr. Baddeley pointed out, this technique
is becoming more and more powerful in
resolution and proper to answer more specif-
ic questions that we could not solve with
lesion/pharmacological approaches. I believe
that someday we will find a way of using this
or other techniques to decode a brain state in
a sensible information useful to compose a
memory trace.
Lynn Nadel: Richard - I would like to
hear your current thoughts about whether
properties evident at one level of analysis
(e.g., cellular/molecular) show up at another
level (e.g., systems) (19). An example might
be the claim that the rapid plasticity evident
in hippocampal long-term potentiation (LTP)
(20) is also evident in the one-trial learning
this system seems to be capable of (21,22).
Do you (and others) think this parallelism is
an accident, or it will turn out to be a general
feature?
Aryeh Routtemberg: Lynn - I grant you
that conceptually, but given that there are
many molecular mechanisms out there, what
would be a plausible molecular/cellular sce-
nario?
Richard Morris: Lynn - I have been
intrigued by the possibility that the one-shot
characteristic of LTP induction may be a
physiological substrate of episodic or epi-
sodic-like memory. A twist is that I don’t
think LTP will, in general, last very long
unless there is relevant protein sequestration
and tag-protein interactions to stabilize these
one-shot changes in synaptic efficacy that
would underlie a ‘record of experience’ (23).
A further twist is I don’t understand the
differential contributions of the hippocam-
pus and prefrontal cortex to episodic memory
- at encoding.
Claudio Da Cunha: I received an e-mail
from Edson Cardia, from Brazil asking about
the participation of cAMP response element
binding (CREB) in the process of learning
and memory. Would someone like to reply?
James McGaugh: Claudio - Evidence of
CREB involvement in memory is interesting
but not very informative as it is upstream
from a large number of genes. Not a very
precise tool, in my view (though, as you
know we have worked on it here - as has
Ivan’s group).
Richard Morris: Ah Jim - but the speci-
ficity need not be at the level of the nucleus.
That’s what the synaptic tagging (23) idea is
partly about. You can have a nuclear signal
that is turned on by a variety of things, and
can trigger via CREB (or other transcrip-
tional activators) all sorts of genes. The pro-
teins then synthesized will only be seques-
tered at activity-regulated sites that have the
appropriate tags. I really like Harry Bito’s
(24) description of this problem as the ‘many-
to-one’ problem (synapses to the nucleus)
and the ‘one-to-many’ problem (nucleus to
the synapses).
Aryeh Routtemberg: Claudio - We have
something like 100,000 genes, of which
roughly 50% are regulatory. Of those 50,000
genes, one of them is CREB. We still need to
know what the other 49,999 are doing. I am
deeply concerned about the focus on CREB
at different levels, but the most important
one is that transcription factors never work
in isolation but in a combinatorial way bind-
ing to recognition sites on the promoter and
forming complex protein-DNA-protein com-
plexes that lead to the initiation of transcrip-
tion. The focus on CREB undermines any
attempt to understand the cell biology of
memory.
James McGaugh: Richard and Aryeh - I
see no conflict in views. CREB clearly gives
no synaptic specificity. But, Richard, how
do we get a flexible behavioral read out from
synaptic specificity? This is the silent ques-
tion.
Ivan Izquierdo: As judged by the effects
of PKA (25) and mitogen-activated protein
kinase (MAPK) inhibitors (26), both sets of
enzymes act at different moments and on
different substrates to create short-term and
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long-term memory in the hippocampus. That
would be a nice starting point: to look for
those substrates. The bad news is that now
it’s known that PKA and the extracellular
signal-regulated kinase system are truly en-
meshed, cross-talk a lot with each other, and
cross-talk with protein kinase C (PKC) a lot
(27).
Aryeh Routtemberg: That’s it! Parallel
signal transduction processes, one leading to
short-term memory retrieval the other kick-
ing long-term memory into operation. Dis-
ruption of the former leads to the kind of
result you have shown. Perhaps cross-talk is
necessary, under normal conditions, for link-
ing both signal transduction streams to long-
term memory.
James McGaugh: Aryeh - Reasonable
resolution. Independent and parallel in de-
velopment. But, again, short-term memory
must rapidly retrieve long-term memory in
order to work.
Ivan Izquierdo: Back to a point raised
by Aryeh. Yes, I suppose there must be
cross-talk between short-term memory and
long-term memory, as there must be be-
tween spatial and contextual components,
declarative and procedural, visual and olfac-
tory, etc. The thing is: who does the cross-
talking and where? For short-term and long-
term memory we do have indirect hints that
it may take place at the PKA-MAPK-PKC
mesh. In the hippocampus at least; perhaps
also in the entorhinal cortex. Now, a major
point is, who cross-talks the very early mo-
ments of memory, those in which, according
to Richard, synapses are tagged, with the
ensuing moments?
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